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100% ASSESSMENT IN KENTUCKY'
Civil action file number S-14-65, for the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals, will undoubtedly become one of the landmark decisions of
this Commonwealth.' This will be the result of not only the con-
troversy surrounding the decision, but also the far reaching results
which will follow.
The suit, as provided by statute for tax questions, was brought
in the Franklin Circuit Court against the Commissioner and the De-
partment of Revenue by residents of Louisville and Jefferson County
who are respectively taxpayers, parents of school children, and
students, for a declaration of rights and injunctive relief in the
nature of a writ of mandamus.
The complaint alleged that Kentucky's Constitution and statutes
require that the Commissioner of Revenue and the county tax com-
missioners throughout the state assess real estate at fair cash value,
but that they consistently violate this requirement by assessing prop-
erty at substantially below fair cash value. The original complaint
was later amended to include not only real but tangible personal
property as a part of the property to be assessed. The complaint
further alleged that the combination of the consistent under assess-
ment and the statutory tax limit based on assessed values had de-
prived the Louisville Independent School District and the Jefferson
County School District of the revenues necessary to provide quality
education in those school districts.
The complaint asked the court to order the Commissioner of
Revenue to (a) instruct the county tax commissioners to assess all
real estate and all tangible personal property at its fair cash value and
(b) to fix the assessment at fair cash value if the county tax com-
missioners fail to do so.
After an answer that admitted the consistent under-assessment,
the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, with extensive support-
ing affidavits, which was granted, but in favor of the defendants
and on three grounds, none of which had been advanced by the de-
fendants. First, the court stated that the allegations of the complaint
raised neither an issue of fact nor of law; that since there was neither
a dispute of fact nor a dispute of law there can be no justifiable
controversy. Second, the court said that other adequate legal reme-
dies existed to effect the consequential relief sought by the plain-
tiffs, so that neither injunction nor mandamus was available; the
* Any views expressed here are those of the writer and not of the Law Journal.
1 Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965).
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court gave no indication as to what the other available remedies
might be. And, third, the court said that the Commissioner of Revenue
had a discretion in the performance of his duties and that the court
could not interfere with the exercise of such discretion.
From the summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs case, they
brought their appeal. An outline of the appellants argument is as
follows:2
I. The Commissioner of Revenue has (a) the duty to instruct the
county tax commissioners to assess all real estate and all tangible
personal property at fair cash value and (b) the further duty, if
the county tax commissioners fail to assess at fair cash value, to fix
the assessment of all real estate and all tangible personal property
at the fair cash value.
1. The constitution and the statutes impose the duties.
2. Fair cash value means fair cash value, not merely uniform
assessment.
3. No prior decision of this court constitutes any obstacle to ac-
cording the term "fair cash value" its plain and intended
meaning.
II. If the Commissioner of Revenue has these duties but fails to per-
form them, the court should order him to perform the duties in
good faith.
1. The plaintiffs have no other plain, adequate and complete
remedy.
2. An order in the nature of Mandamus or mandatory injunction
is appropriate to compel the good faith performance of an
executive duty.
:3. An order directing the good faith performance of the duties
would not improperly interfere with executive discretion.
To this appeal, the appellees answered:3
I. The appellants have no standing to maintain this action, because
they have failed to comply with the statutes requiring that all
taxpayers list their property at fair cash value.
II. justiciable controversy exists in this case.
1. The allegation that there is not enough money to provide
quality education or pay adequate teachers salaries because
property is not assessed at fair cash value presents a political
question and not a justiciable controversy.
2. The relationship between lack of "quality" education and in-
adequate teachers salaries and "culturally deprived" children
and the assessment of property at fair cash value is too tenuous
to support a declaration of rights in this case.
IllI. Neither the Constitution of Kentucky nor her statutes require that
all real property and tangible personal property in the Common-
wealth must be assessed at fair cash value.
2 Brief for Appellant, pp. i-iv.
3 Brief for Appellee, pp. iiiR-vR.
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1. Section 172 of the Kentucky Constitution, KRS 132.440,
132.450, and 133.150 are without legal effect because they
have been abrogated by contrary public policy of more than
seventy-five years standing.
2. The Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1956 held that Section 172
of the Constitution no longer requires the assessment of all
property at its fair cash value.
3. In view of the long standing public policy of assessing prop-
erty at a percentage of fair cash value and the chaotic situa-
tion which wolud be created by an abrupt transition to assess-
ment at fair cash value with the resulting quadrupling of the
effective tax rate, the Commissioner of Revenue has discretion
which he must exercise in equalizing property to prevent the
creation of an intolerable situation.
IV. This is not a proper case for the remedies of Mandamus or Man-
datory Injunction.
1. In order for the appellants to raise the cry for mandamus, they
must come into court with clean hands.
2. An examination of the assessment process and its history shows
that the Commissioner of Revenue must have discretion in
equalizing property under KRS 138.150; therefore, the reme-
dies of mandamus or mandatory injunction will not lie.
The appellants, feigning surprise, submitted a reply to the answer
in which they reiterated sections I and 11(2) of their original brief,
plus replying to the appellees heretofore unargued position that the
appellants have no standing.
The Court of Appeals, as everyone in Kentucky by now knows,
overruled the lower court and granted the appellants claims. That
decision is the subject of this note. While there are other areas in-
directly involved, Section 172 of the Constitution and Sections
132.440, 132.440(1), 183.150 (as amended in 1964), and 131.020(1)
of Kentucky Revised Statutes are the sources of law principally in-
volved. The decision could be divided into numerous areas, but
for the purposes of this note lends itself more easily into three. They
are: (1) The rationale of the decision; (2) The judicial interpreta-
tion; (3) The probable results-both legalistic and economic.
RATIONALE OF THE DECISION:
While many factors played a part in kindling this decision, un-
doubtedly the principal one is the position that the school boards in
Kentucky find themselves in today, particularly in the Jefferson
County area. Tethered to the statutory (KRS 160.475) maximum
school tax role of $1.50 per $100.00 of assessed value (except for
higher voted rates permitted for construction purposes under KRS
160.477 and KRS 162.080, or higher rates necessary to meet the
"required local effort" fixed by KRS 157.380), local school financing
[Vol. K4
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has been drawn into an ever narrowing circle by the constantly
decreasing ratio of assessed to fair cash value. The progression of
assessment ratios further from actual cash value through the years
has forced the rates levied higher and higher. School boards now
have no place to turn; they have reached the $1.50 ceiling. During
the past six years the progression has been as follows: 4
School Districts School Districts School Districts
Year Under $1.50 Rate Over $1.50 Rate With $1.50 Rate
1959 ............................ 7 87 118
1960 ............................ 7 91 113
1961 ............................ 8 98 103
1962 ............................ 3 107 96
1963 ............................ 4 111 89
1964 ............................ 3 110 91
To further understand these events, we need to digress some-
what. Taxes are levied in three main ways: (1) on incomes of persons
and corporations; (2) on transactions (sales taxes) or for the priv-
ilege of making transactions of various kinds; and (3) on wealth
owned, i.e., property. Local school boards get most of the money
to operate the public schools from the latter in the form of: (1)
the local ad valorem property tax levied under KRS 160.460-.440. For
the school year ending June 30, 1964, local tax levies accounted for
approximately 40% and state funds accounted for approximately
58% of the total public school budget.5 (2) funds provided by the
state under the Foundation Program, KRS 157.310-.540. Of the three
main tax-levies it is the property tax administration that has had
the less forceful administration, and therein lies the root of the school
crisis today.
The U.S. Census records show that Kentucky is underusing the
property tax compared with the average of all states. This is indi-
cated by the following: 6
PROPERTY TAX AS PER CENT OF TOTAL
STATE AND LOCAL TAXES
All States Kentucky
1942 ........................................ 53.2% 47.0%
1953 ........................................ 44.8% 39.8%
1957 ........................................ 44 .6% 36.3%
1962 ........................................ 45.9% 30.2%
4 Department of Revenue, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Kentucky Property




The degree of utilization of the property tax by our neighbor
states is shown by the following percentages that property taxes were
to state and local taxes in 1962:7
Illinois ...................................................................... 53 .2%
Indiana ...................................................................... 56.1%
Ohio .......................................................................... 52.1%
W est Virginia ............................................................ 27.2%
Virginia .................................................................... 3 6.0%
Tennessee .................................................................. 33.3%
M issouri .................................................................... 42.5%
The upshot of the foregoing is that the people in Kentucky are
now paying much less for schools than people in most other states.
A recent U.S. Census Bureau reports shows that Kentucky's local
property taxes are equal to only 2.5 per cent of the state's personal
income, compared with the national average of 4.3 per cent. Another
U.S. Census Bureau publication 9 shows that the effective rate of
taxation on real property in Kentucky is only 0.7 per cent while the
national average is approximately 1.4 per cent of market value.
The latest available estimates for 1964-65 from the National Edu-
cation Association show Kentucky's below-average rating for schools:' 0
National Average Kentucky
Expenditures Per Pupil ........................ $ 483 $ 323
Average Teacher's Salary ...................... $6,235 $4,750
In addition to the above, the default in enforcement has rendered
the debt limitations contained in Sections 157 and 158 of the Con-
stitution a complete farce. Local school and governmental units have
been forced into comparatively expensive revenue bond financing.
Section 158 forbids school districts to incur indebtedness exceeding
2% of the assessed property valuation. As of June 80, 1964 all prop-
erty in Kentucky subject to full local taxation was assessed at
$4,684,353,462.0011 The 2% Constitutional school debt limitation
would thus equal 92V million dollars. In fact the total indebted-
ness of all Kentucky school districts as of that date was in excess
of 208 millions of dollars, of which 201 millions were in revenue
bonds. This total debt equals 4.88% of the total assessed property
value.12
7 ibid.
8 U.S. Census Bureau, Governmental Finances in 1963.
9 U.S. Census Bureau, Property Taxation in 1962.
10 Brief for the Kentucky Education Association and Board of Education of
Jefferson County, Kentucky as Amicus Curiae, p. 15.
" Certification from J. E. Luckett, Commissioner of Revenue, to Harry
M. Sparks, Superintendent of Public Instruction, March 8, 1965.
12 Kentucky Department of Education, Bonded Indebtedness of Kentucky
School Districts as of June 80, 1964.
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Enlightening as the above is, it still fails to take into consideration
the practice in Kentucky of "backdoor financing," used by some of
our state educational institutions. Rather than go through the state
and risk having their requests denied, these institutions are handling
their own financing by borrowing capital guaranteed by the revenue
intake of the institution or the particular building being financed.
The result is that the state is borrowing money with their name
never appearing in an obligatory capacity, through these agencies.
While the school dilemma would have to be given as the main
and most pressing reason for the decision, there are other factors
which were unquestionably taken into consideration.
For example, while the schools have found themselves in a strait,
so too, the ability of the county fiscal courts to provide essential gov-
ernmental services (including funds to pay local school boards for
the transportation of non-public school students) has been frozen
at the assessment level fixed by the tax commissioners. As the ratio
of assessed to fair cash value diminished, rates for county purposes
have increased until they too have reached the limit in this case.
The progression of county rates in recent years is as follows:13
Counties Under Counties Over Total Counties Average
Year The 500 Rate The 500 Rate Reporting Rate
1959 ........................ 2 33 102 58.00
1960 .............2 32 103 57.90
1961 ........................ 1 29 100 57.60
1962 ........................ 1 30 102 57.90
1963 ........................ 1 31 81 62.00
1964 ........................ 1 120 62.5¢
Thus, by 1964, the median county assessment ratio in Kentucky
had declined to 27% on real estate, 35% on motor vehicles and 30%
on other tangible personal property, while local rates had climbed
to the statutory or constitutional limit.14
Since the tax commissioner would be an administrative head,
and thus under the control of the Governor, it would be from the
Governor that relief might be expected to emanate. But, for any
Governor to make such a foolhearty step, would be as certain political
suicide as could be imagined. In fact, a former Governor had a
study made of the problem but refused to use it, stating that to
do so would be his ruin. Further evidence of this fact can clearly
be seen through the efforts of our present Governor to disclaim any
and all responsibilit, for the decision, and nevertheless, the blame
13 Department of Revenue, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Kentucky Prop-
erty Tax Rates, 1959-1964.14 Brief for the Kentucky School Boards Association as Amicus Curiae, p. 5.
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being laid squarely upon his shoulders accompanied by ominous
rumblings to the effect that the Democratic Party in Kentucky has
dug its own grave. (The present Court of Appeals is predominately
Democratic). Thus, the refusal or inability of the Governor to act
contributed also to the decision.
Another factor, and one which was given much emphasis by the
appellants, was the inequalities created by the present situation in
Kentucky. With each county forming its own assessment base, then
from county to county there is a wide range of assessment ratios
which run from a low of 21.64% in Wayne County to a high of
45.74% in Bellevue Independent District.15 But, perhaps the most
glaring inequality from county to county would be in regard to the
state property tax of five cents per hundred.
Connected with the above, would be the resulting discretion
given to the local tax assessors. Since, in most instances, the maxi-
mum rate was being levied, it was up to him to determine how
much revenue would be needed and to set the ratio at a percentage
which would achieve that figure. He was then, in effect, both assessor
and budget director.
With the preceding factors as the background, we now turn our
attention upstage to. the decision itself. The school boards were in
a position that compelled them to do something or watch Kentucky's
school system completely mire down. That "something" found its
being in the unique approach the plaintiffs devised to force com-
pliance with the Constitution and statutes. It is with the arguments
and interpretations made in reaching this decision that we now deal
in the following section.
THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION:
Before proceeding, it is interesting to observe that the court has
thrust the appellees into the position of the appellant in their opinion.
Rather than testing the appellants arguments as to validity warranting
a reversal, they have taken the appellees arguments and examined
them to determine whether they warrant not reversing the decision.
Through their brief dismissal of the causes for a directed verdict in
the lower court, they have in effect placed the burden of proof upon
the appellees. It would seem that a more proper procedure would
have been to decide the "controversy issue" and then have remanded
for a new triall
- The first argument to be considered is that of the appellees, to
the effect that Section 172 of the Constitution of Kentucky and Sec-
15 Id. at 6.
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tions 132.440, 132.450, and 133.150 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
are without legal effect because they have been abrogated by con-
trary public policy of more than seventy-five years standing. Counsel
for appellee stated that there is evidence that these laws have been
ignored both by the various assessing authorities and by the inhabi-
tants of this Commonwealth since the time of their enactment.
16
Appellee went on to point out the chaos which would be created
by any attempt to assess such property at its fair cash value without
a complete overhaul of the existing tax rate structures and assess-
ment machinery.
To these arguments, the appellants conceded that there might
be a place for a doctrine of statutory non-user when a manifestly
unfair discriminatory enforcement is made of an obsolete statute.
But not, an application to the notion that assessing officials can
repeal the fundamental organic law of their state by flagrantly failing
to perform their official duties.
In support of their statutory non-user argument the appellees
cited three authorities. In the first of these, an 1840 Iowa case, the court
stated:17
It is true, that public opinion would frequently be a very unsafe guide
for a judicial decision. But where the same opinions are concurred in
for centuries, and after passion and prejudice have wholly subsided,
such opinions are always founded in truth and justice, and can more
safely be followed than those of the most learned and able judges....
If custom can make laws, it can, when long acquiesced in, recognized,
and countenanced by the sovereign power, also repeal them.
Appellants did not argue this case and the court unceremonially
dismissed it by saying that the soundness of such a theory may well
be questioned.
The second case used by the appellees was an 1860 Supreme
Court decision.18 The appellees contended that this case represented
the doctrine that if a uniform, notorious and uninterrupted custom,
then it would operate to repeal the prior law. But as the appellants
adequately pointed out, the Supreme Court was simply applying
a distinctive part of Spanish Civil Law doctrine providing for recog-
nition of custom, to a will or case arising under the Hispano-Mexican
law. Nowhere did the Court suggest that such a doctrine be im-
ported into American law.
The last case cited by appellees, on this point, was Poe v. Ullman,
l0 Louisville Railway Co. v. Comm., 105 Ky. 723, 49 S.W. 486 (1899);
Louisville and Nashville RR. Co. v. Green, 244 U.S. 522.
17 Hill v. Smith, 1 Morris 95 (Iowa 1840).Is Adams v. Norris, 64 U.S. 353 (1860).
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a more recent (1961) Supreme Court decision.' Here the appellees
cited a statement by Justice Frankfurter that:
Deeply embedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy-or not
carrying it out-are often tougher and truer law than the dead words
of written text.
But, as appellants again adequately pointed out, because in this
case there was the possibility that the law would never be carried
out, the case was mute, and the Court would not then decide the
grave constitutional question. Nowhere did they say that non-use
would repeal the law. Indeed, in 1961, following the Poe case, supra,
there was opened a birth control clinic, which was contrary to the
Connecticut law involved in the Poe case, supra, and the instigators
were immediately arrested with their conviction being upheld by
the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors.20 The court, in its opinion,
did not mention the non-user theory.
The single case cited by appellants in the support of their argu-
ment, and the one cited by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in their
opinion, was District of Columbia v. Thompson Co.21 This case seems
to adequately summarize the state of the law in the United States in
regard to the doctrine of non-user. There the court stated:
The failure of the executive branch of the government to enforce a law
does not result in its modification or repeal. (See Annot., 20 L. ed 235)
It thus appears that the appellees, on their first argument, were
met and with judicial correctness defeated on all fronts. Before pro-
ceeding, however, it is worthy of note that the appellees failed to
mention a closely related doctrine, and one which might seem to
have more or some significant support-that is, the doctrine of ad-
ministrative construction. A general statement of this doctrine is:22
The practical interpretation of an ambiguous or uncertain statute by the
executive department charged with its administration or enforcement
is entitled to the highest respect, and, though not controlling, if acted
upon for a number of years, will not be disturbed except for very
cogent and persuasive reasons. (See both 73 L. ed 322 and 84 L. ed
28 for Kentucky cases accepting the doctrine)
This doctrine is equally as applicable to constitutional as statutory
construction2 3 and has for its basis the respect due administrative
authority, in that the officers concerned are usually able men and
19367 U.S. 497, (1961).
2o State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A.2d 479 (1964).
21846 U.S. 100 (1952).
22 Annot., 73 L. ed. 322; 84 L. ed 28; See these also for Kentucky cases ac-
cepting the doctrine.23 Annot., 73 L. ed. 322.
[Vol. 5 ,
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masters of the subject, being, not infrequently, draftsmen of the law
they are called on to interpret.24
Of course, the lion in the path here is that the construction must
be doubtful or in other words the provision must be rationally open
to more than one interpretation. But as the Kentucky Court itself
has pointed out in Harrison v. Commissioners25
The very fact that persons, and even courts, (emphasis added) are dif-
fering as to its meaning (a statute) tends strongly to show that it is,
at least, of doubtful import.
And regardless of what the Kentucky Court says in its opinion, they
have created some ambiguity through their equality decisions and
apparent acquiescence in fractional assessments, as we shall see later.
In addition, there are even exceptions to the need for ambiguity.
As held in the Harrison case, supra:
The practical construction given to a statute, through a long period,
and acquiesced in by all departments of the government, should control
the court in construing it, even though that construction may contra-
vene the letter of the law.
Thus, there seems to be Kentucky authority for an "implied repeal"
of constitutional provisions, but through administrative interpretation,
rather than non-use.28
One other point bears mentioning before continuing, and that
is that there is also authority, but none from Kentucky, to the effect
that the silence of Congress or a state legislature in the face of a
long-continued departmental practice or statutory construction is the
equivalent of legislative consent for the continuance of such practice.27
While the appellees had little success with their non-user argu-
ment, it can be said that even though giving a better battle with
their second argument, they nevertheless fared no better.
In essence, the appellee's second contention is to the effect that the
Kentucky Court of Appeals in previous cases, has interpreted the
applicable provisions as not requiring assessment at fair cash value,
but rather mere equality.
The principle case in this line of related cases in Kentucky, is
Eminence Distillery Co. v. Henry County Board.28 In that case a tax-
payer had appealed to the courts, contending that the assessed value
of his property exceeded fair cash value and that, even after the
24 U.S. v. Moore, 95 U.S. 763 (1877).
25 83 Ky. 162 (1885).
26 See also, Annot., 73 L. ed 322, for further exceptions to the need for am-
biguit, from other jurisdictions.27 Annots., 84 L. ed. 28; 110 A.L.R. 1158; 98 A.L.R. 1332.
28178 Ky. 811, 200 S.E. 347 (1918).
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fair cash value was correctly determined, the assessment should be
revised downward to the prevailing assessment ratio in his county.
The circuit court concluded that the taxpayer's assessment was
excessive and reduced the assessment to fair cash value; but the
circuit court refused to reduce the assessment below the fair cash
value of the property.
The Court of Appeals held that the assessment should be equalized
downward to the prevailing level in the taxpayer's county. The court
had this to say concerning the remedy that could be granted by the
Kentucky courts:
It is very clear that the circuit court and this court are authorized to
revise an assessment and to reduce an assessment of property to its fair
cash value, which the circuit court did; but should it have gone further
and given the appellant complete relief and remedied the wrong which
was done it by reducing the amount at which the property should be
valued for taxation to a sum less than its fair cash value, so as to have
established equality between it and other taxpayers, upon the ground
that the assessment made of the property as its fair cash value was a
violation of the law as to the constitutional essential of equality and a
denial to the appellant of the equal protection of the laws secured
to it by article 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution? Of course the board of supervisors could have remedied the
inequality between the assessment of appellant and that of other tax-
payers by increasing the assessment of the property of the other tax-
payers in the county to its fair cash value. This, however, it did not do.
The quarterly court, circuit court, and this court are without neces-
sary powers to effect the remedy in that way. Such a remedy the ap-
pellant cannot make effective, and the result is that it is no remedy at
all as to it. The only practical remedy is to reduce the assessment
of appellants property to 60 per centum of its value, and thus make
the burden to be borne by it equal to that borne by other taxpayers.
It is clear that the court has not given its stamp of approval to the
practice of lower assessment, but merely accepted this practice in
performing its overriding duty to dispense justice in individual cases.
As stated in Luckett v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co.,2 9 the latest
in the line of cases beginning with the Eminence Distillery Co. case,
supra:
All the property owners were not before the court, hence it was neces-
sary, in order to achieve equality for the tax-payer whose property
had been appraised at full value, to reduce the assessment to the gen-
eral level.
It was this reasoning that the appellants pointed out. Previous
to these points, however, the appellants showed by refering to the
29 331 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1960).
debates had, when our present Constitution was being drafted,30
that the committee charged with the responsibility of drafting the
property tax provisions had fully intended that full cash value be
used in achieving equality. There was in fact some debate as to
whether these terms were not synonomous and therefore repetitious.
The committee decided by a vote of 44 to 28 that this was not the
case.3 ' In so doing the appellants gave use to a rule of constitutional
interpretation that has been recognized in Kentucky in the case of
Herold v. Talbott.- That court stated:
Where meaning of constitutional provision is in doubt, provision should
be given meaning which it possessed at the time of its framing and
adoption, as determined, by contemporaneous legislation and adminis-
trative construction as to the sense in which the constitutional conven-
tion used words contained in doubtful provisions.
The appellees in attempting to rebut the appellants arguments
relied extensively upon two cases.
The first of these was City of Louisville v. Martin,33 which was also
a case on which the appellants had relied in their brief. The appellees
pointed out a statement by the court that:
This court has held in such circumstances that all taxpayers should
be treated alike and that there should be no discrimination between
different classes.
This case cited the Eminence Distillery case, supra, and the "circum-
stances" referred to in the statement are that the court could not
raise all taxpayers rates, so in the cause of justice they simply dis-
pensed equality. This case, therefore, did not stand for the proposi-
tion for which the appellees might have hoped it would.
The second, and more important, case cited by the appellees was
cited not for its holding, but for its dictum3 4 There the court held
that it was not compelled to reduce intangible personal property as-
sessments below the constitutional level merely because there was
systematic underassessment of real estate in the same county. But,
within the opinion, at pp. 482 the court stated:
It is quite apparent that the original purpose of Sections 171 and 172
was to achieve equality in the burden of taxation . . . equality of burden
3oOfficial Reports of the Proceedings and Debates in the Convention As-
sembled at Frankfort, on the Eighth Day of September, 1890, to Adopt, Amend
or Change the Constitution of the State of Kentucky.
312 Debates 2749.
32 261 Ky. 634, 88 S.V.2d 303 (1935).
33284 Ky. 490, 144 S.W.2d 1034 (1940).34 Kentucky Finance Company v. McCord, 290 S.W.2d 481 (Ky. 1956).
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could not exist without uniformity in the mode of assessment as well
as in the rate of taxation. Accordingly, Section 171 required uniformity
of rate, and Section 172 required uniformity of assessment.
This case, also cited Greene v. Louisville and Interurban RR Co.,3
5
a case having its inception in Kentucky, at pp. 680, where the court
said:
... the principal if not the sole reason for adopting fair cash value as
the standard for valuations is as a convenient means to an end,-the end
being equal taxation.
It would therefore seem that at this particular point in time, the
Kentucky Court was a little unsure as to what their interpretations
of these provisions were to be. While I feel that it is reasonably
clear that the weight of Kentucky cases indicated that the court was
not approving deviation from assessment at full value, but rather,
in the sake of dispensing individual justice, was forced to tolerate it, I
nevertheless feel that there certainly has been ambiguity created in
this field, as I stated earlier in regard to the administrative interpre-
tation doctrine.
Therefore, as stated earlier, even though presenting a better
argument, the appellees nevertheless fared no better in the court's
eyes in this argument than they did in their first.
To keep the slate clean, it is only fitting, as we shall now see,
that the appellees were no more successful in their last argument.
As stated by the court, this argument was that, assuming this
situation should somehow be rectified, this is not a proper instance
for the remedy of mandamus. They argued -firstly, that since the
plaintiffs did not force the Jefferson County Assessor to assess their
own property at full value, then they had no standing to maintain this
suit in a court of equity which is based on the old "clean hands"
theory that the person coming into equity, must do so free from
fault. Secondly, they argue that the plaintiffs are attempting to
have a court enforce a discretionary duty of the Commissioner, and
since one of the fundamental rules of mandamus is that it will not
lie to enforce discretionary duties, this is not the proper case for the
action. To prove that the Commissioner must have discretion in
equalizing property for ad valorem tax purposes in the Common-
wealth, the appellees attempted to prove that the Commissioner does
not have complete control over the county assessors, plus the im-
possibility of the Commissioner being able to carry out his duties
without the aid of his staff and the several county assessors. The
8 244 U.S. at 516.
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relevance of the proof to the presumption escapes this writer. Evi-
dently, it was a vain attempt to in some way refute the appellants
arguments on this score.
In the appellant's argument on this issue, they stated that if the
Commissioner failed to perform his duties, then the court should order
him to do so. They substantiated this declaration by showing: (I)
The plaintiffs have no other remedy-(a) The statutes provide no
administrative steps that would enable the plaintiffs to compel the
Department of Revenue to propose increases and to conduct hearings.
KRS 131.340 provides only for appeals by taxpayers who contend
that they are being forced to pay too much tax; (b) There is no
way the plaintiffs could oust the Commissioner, and even if there
were, this would be of no assurance that the next man would offer
any improvement; (c) Even if there were some way to force the
Jefferson County Assessors to assess at full value, every landowner
in the county could petition to have their tax lowered since they
would be taxed higher than the average of the state. This would
be the result of the settled rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Hillsborough Township v. Cromwell.36 That rule is this:
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
the individual from state action which selects him out for discrimina-
tory treatment by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the
same class. The right is the right to equal treatment. He may not
complain if equality is achieved by increasing the same taxes of other
members of the class to the level of his own. The constitutional require-
ment, however, is not satisfied if a State does not itself remove the
discrimination, but imposes on him against whom the discrimination
has been directed the burden of seeking an upward revision of the
taxes of other members of the class.
Accordingly, under the Hillsborough Township doctrine Jefferson
County real estate could not constitutionally be assessed at a level
higher than real estate elsewhere in the state. Even if an owner of
Jefferson county real estate assessed at fair cash value had some
way to compel that all other real estate in Kentucky be assessed at
fair cash value, his relative overassessment would be unconstitutional
if he had the burden of seeking an upward revision of the real estate
assessments in other countries.37 (II) An order in the nature of
mandamus or mandatory injunction is appropriate to compel the good
faith performance of an executive duty. Here the appellants used a
definition of mandamus taken from Section 477 of the old Civil Code
of Practice in Kentucky. That section reads:
36 326 U.S. 620 (1946).
37 Brief for Appellant, p. 27.
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The writ of mandamus, as treated of in this chapter, is an order of a
court of competent and original jurisdiction commanding an executive
or ministerial officer to perform an act, or omit to do an act, the per-
formance or omission of which is enjoined by law.
To show the applicability of the section today, the appellants cited
Rule 81 of our present Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
Relief heretofore available by the remedies of mandamus . . . may be
obtained ... under the practice prescribed in these Rules.
Furthermore, conceding that the Commissioner's function is dis-
cretionary, appellants cite Gayheart v. Childers,38 where the court
said:
Mandamus will issue to compel the exercise of a discretionary duty,
but not that it shall be exercised in any particular way.
It would seem that there would be no question concerning the
legality of such proceedings. (III.) An order directing the good faith
performance of the duties would not improperly interfere with
executive discretion. While appellants give considerable argument
and citations3 9 supporting their argument, it can probably be best
summarized by the statement of the Kentucky Court when they
said at page 5 of their opinion:
It is obvious the Constitution and the statutes impose very specific duties
upon county tax commissioners and the Commissioner of Revenue with
respect to the assessment of all property at its fair cash value. There is
nothing discretionary about these basic duties. While there may be op-
tional methods of performance, it is absurd to suggest that the county
tax commissioners or the Commissioner of Revenue may comply with
the law or ignore it in their discretion.
In further support of their decision, the court cited on page six
of their opinion, cases from other jurisdictions similar to the deci-
sion just reached. One of those cases, from New Jersey, is particularly
interesting. 40 There it was a matter of taxing the plaintiffs at full
value and no one else with a mandamus to force the assessors to
assess at full value. In other words, the plaintiffs here were being
assessed at full value while in our Kentucky case, the plaintiffs wanted
the court to tax themselves plus everyone else at full value. The
use of mandamus is common to both cases. There is, however, one
big difference. In the New Jersey instance, the Village of Ridgefield
38 137 Ky. 472, 125 S.W. 1085 (1910).39 Flynn v. Barnes, 156 Ky. 498, 161 S.W. 523 (1913); Dickens v. Cave, 93
Ky. 389, 20 S.W. 282 (1892); Nohthington v. Sublette, 114 Ky. 72, 69 S.W. 1076
(1902); Commonwealth v. Boone County Court, 82 Ky. 637 (1885); Cassidy,
Auditor's Agent v. Young, County Judge, 92 Ky. 230, 17 S.W. 485 (1891).4 o Village of Ridgefield Park v. Bergen County Court of Taxation, 31 N.J.
420, 157 A.2d 829 (1960).
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case, supra, had a predecessor. The New Jersey court had the same
question two years earlier in Switz v. Middletown Township,41 but had
decided the issuance of mandamus, to achieve true value, should be
delayed two years to the end that the legislature would have an
adequate opportunity to explore the subject. The New Jersey court
evidently felt this was more properly a legislative matter and gave
the legislature time in which to act and rectify the situation. There,
the legislature had not acted by the time for a decision in Village of
Ridgefield, supra, and the court felt they could delay no longer the
rights of the plaintiffs. The mandamus was issued. The important
thing in regard to the case was the delay given by the New Jersey
court. This procedure might have been adopted by the Kentucky
court, and thereby avoided the cry of judicial-legislation that has
arisen in some corners.
Accompanying the cry of judicial-legislation from the opponents
of the decision is the wail that the Kentucky Court of Appeals
knows no boundaries in its interpretations. They cite this case as the
extreme in literal interpretation, and the recent 1962 salary limita-
tion decision2 as the other extreme, or the implied interpretation.
That action brought before the court the provisions of section one of
an act of the 1962 General Assembly, known as House Bill No. 65,
which was to become effective July 1, 1962, and which in all prac-
tical effect raised the salary of circuit judges from $8,400 a year to
$10,800, $2,400 over the dollar limit stated in Section 246 of the
Constitution. The court there said:
Salary provisions of state constitution may be interpreted and peri-
odically applied to all constitutional officers in terms which will equate
current salaries with the purchasing power of the dollar at the time
when such salary provisions were adopted, and the 1949 constitutional
limitation of salaries of circuit judges is to be treated as a scale of value
rather than as nominal "dollar" limitation, so as to permit adoption
of limitation to changing values of purchasing power of the "dollar" and
the general cost of living.
The court also said:
It will be observed that Section 246 of the Constitution does not fix
the compensation; it merely puts a limit on the "dollars" that can be
paid without stating whether they are "dollars" of 1949 purchasing power
or "dollars" of current value.
In that case, the court used the Consumer's Price Index for March
1962 to determine what $8,400 would be worth today. (The decision
would also make the Judges of the Court of Appeals eligible for
4123 N.J. 580, 130 A.2d 15 (1957).4 2 Matthews v. Allen, 360 S.W.2d 135 (1962).
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$15,468.00 using the same formula as applied in this case of 128.9 is to
100 as X is to 8400). A thought comes to mind that if the constitu-
tion is to be read in terms of what the "dollars" meant back in 1949,
when this provision was amended, why not read full value as it was
used or practiced back in 1890. While most states had the full assess-
ment provisions, none of them were complying with them, then or
now.
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This then, is the substance of the argument presented by counsel
for both sides, and the decisions reached by the court. This is the
past and present of the decision. But, the future is surely to follow,
and with it, many, many problems and decisions to be faced. While
it will be impossible, to foresee all the contingencies which are to
arise, it is now to thoughts of the posisbilities that we turn our
attention.
PROBABLE RESULTS: BOTH LEGALISTIC AND ECONOMIC:
Before a person could fully appreciate the consequences of this
decision, he must understand, at least, the basic tax structure in Ken-
tucky. While it will be assumed that a larger part of the readers
of this article will be attorneys and therefore will be versed on this
subject, there will also be readers who don't understand Kentucky's
tax set-up and it is to this class that the following brief analysis
of taxes in Kentucky is directed.
There are four principal governments in Kentucky which levy
and collect property taxes to support their operations: 44
I. State Government-State tax rates on property are fixed by the
Legislature, which meets in January-March in even-numbered years.
State tax rates on property range from 1 mill (one-tenth of a cent)
to $2.50, depending upon the type of property being taxed.
II. County Government-Property-tax rates are fixed by the "fiscal
court" in each of the 120 counties. Fiscal courts are not "courts" at
all. They are legislative bodies which administer county affairs.
They are two types: (1) The county judge and four county commis-
sioners, or (2) the county judge and all of a county's magistrates.
All of these officials are elected by the people every four years.
Kentucky's Constitution limits the tax that fiscal courts can levy
on property to 50 cents per $100 of assessed value. Higher taxes
43 Howerton, Full-Value Assessment Unique? Courier-Journal (Louisville)
June 11, 1965, p. 7, col. I (Quoting Dr. Troy Westmeyer, professor in New
York University Graduate School of Public Administration.44 Morris, The New Property Taxes, Courier-Journal (Louisville) June 27,
1965, Section 4.
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may be imposed if a majority of a county's voters approve. These
are known as "voted taxes."
III. City Government-Property-tax rates for cities are fixed by a
city's legislative body (board of aldermen, city council or city com-
mission). All of these officials are elected by the people every four
years.
Kentucky has six classes of cities. Louisville is the only city of
the first class. Kentucky's Constitution limits the maximum prop-
erty tax that can be imposed by Louisville's Board of Aldermen to
$1.50. A higher tax can be levied only if Louisville voters approve.
There are eight second-class cities. The State Constitution limits the
property tax that can be levied by the city councils and city com-
missions of these cities to $1.00 unless their voters approve a higher
rate. All other Kentucky cities and towns are in Classes 3, 4, 5 and 6.
Kentucky's Constitution limits the property tax that can be levied
by these cities of 10,000 population or less to 75 cents, unless their
voters approve higher rates.
IV. School Government-Public schools are operated by 201
boards of education and the superintendents they employ. Property-
tax rates are established by these five-member boards of education,
elected by the people every four years.
The State Legislature limits the maximum tax that a school board
can levy on property to $1.50, unless voters living in the school district
approve a higher tax rate.
School governments operate within "school districts." Some school
districts include an entire county. Others embrace just parts of a
county. Some include parts of two adjacent counties.
There are two types of school districts: (1) County school dis-
tricts, and (2) independent school districts. Every county must
operate a system of common schools unless cities, or other areas
within the county, operate their own school systems independent of
the county.
Next, we should consider how the assessing and taxing system
works in Kentucky, the steps each property owner and official
must take under the law, and safeguards that protect everyone's
rights:4z
The fair cash value of property is estimated by the owner at what
it would bring at a fair voluntary sale on Jan. 1 of each year. (In
some second and third-class cities, this valuation also must be made




March 1 every year, property owners must deliver a listing of all
their property, with fair cash value stated, to the local assessor and
swear to its accuracy. (In cities with independent assessments, using
a July 1 assessment date, the list also must be delivered to the city
assessor between July 1st and September 1st every year.) Persons
who willfully fail to submit these property lists are subpect to fines
and contempt of court. Further, the local assessor will arbitrarily
place a valuation upon their property.
All property owners should examine the assessment roll in their
county (and city, if there is also a separate city assessment made).
The purpose of this is to confirm not only your own assessment, but
to examine those of neighbors and friends, for these are public
records. If an underassessment is suspected, the local assessor's at-
tention should be directed to it.
In April every year, the county judge in every county appoints
a "board of supervisors" from among property owners in the county
to review all property assessments. By the first Monday in May, the
local assessor must send a complete list of the county's property and
its assessed values to the State Revenue Department. The state of-
ficials check for fair and equitable valuations within counties, and
among counties. Any property owner dissatisfied with his assess-
ment may appeal to the board of supervisors in his county to change
it. Boards of supervisors convene on the second Monday in May
each year, and are in session for five days.
Property owners dissatisfied with their assessments who fail to
obtain relief from their board of supervisors may appeal next to
the State Board of Tax Appeals at Frankfort. If the State Board of
Tax Appeals affords no relief to a dissatisfied property owner, he can
appeal to Franklin Circuit Court. If Franklin Circuit Judge Meigs
fails to satisfy a dissident property owner, he can ask the State Court
of Appeals to review his case.
Between June 1 and June 20 each year, the State Revenue De-
partment completes its review of assessment rolls in all counties and
returns them, approved, to the county-court clerk in each county.
Between June 20 and June 80 each year, the total assessed value
of all property in a county is certified to the fiscal court, the county
board of education, and in some instances to the city legislative body
and to the independent district board of education. These tax-levying
bodies then determine the local tax rates that will apply to this
property.
By Sept. 15 each year, county clerks must turn over the tax bills
they have prepared to the sheriff in each county for collection.
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Sheriffs must mail notices to every taxpayer, notifying him of the
amount due. Tax bills paid between Sept. 15 and Nov. 1 each year
are allowed a discount of 2 per cent of the tax due. From Nov. 2
through Dec. 81, all tax bills are due without discount. From Jan. 1
through Jan. 81 of the following year, unpaid tax bills carry a 2 per
cent penalty. After Jan. 81, unpaid tax bills carry a penalty of 6
percent.
Now to consider the effect of Russman v. Luckett, supra, on this
tax structure. Before continuing, it is important to point out that
this decision does not become effective until January 1, 1966. It is
binding upon all property in Kentucky (not exempted by Constitu-
tion) and is binding upon all public officials. The assumption is that
this includes city assessors as well as county. It directs the defendant
Commissioner of Revenue to comply with his duties and to inform
all county tax commissioners of the effect of this decision and their
assessment duties under the Constitution and statutes of the Com-
monwealth as decided by this decision.
The implementation of this decision has begun and will prob-
ably continue for many years to come. The problems to be en-
countered are numerous. I shall now discuss some of those likely to be
encountered, under some seven general areas.
ASSESSMENT:
Of all the areas, this is the one which will be the most difficult,
and the problem of determining what the "full value" of real estate
or personalty really is will be the main cause for this difficulty. Just
how does one go about deciding what this magic figure is? Is it the
value of land at its present use, or is it the value of its potential?
If through some quirk there happens to be a pig-pen resting squarely
in the middle of expensive sub-division land, what is the "full value"
of the land? Its use as a pig pen, which will be nominal, or its value
as a home site? If we decide the value is to be determined by the
use, which will undoubtedly be the case, what is to prevent someone
from using potentially expensive property as a pig-pen to deter high
property taxes? But, if we use potential, who is to draw the line?
My back-yard could conceivably be the future launching site for a
Mars bound spaceship!
A good example of this problem can be found in the case of the
famous race horse, Bold Ruler. He is now assessed, for tax purposes,
at $15,000.0O.40 A more realistic value would be $875,000.00. But,
there is no way to actually tell until he is sold, and this will never
46 Ibid.
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happen. There is no other Bold Ruler to use as a guide in setting
the price. If an established breeder bought the horse, he might be
willing to pay only $255,000, since his need isn't so great. But, a new
breeder, who is in need of building a reputation has to have a great
stud, and he might be willing to pay two or three million to persuade
the Wheatley Stable owners to part with the horse.
This leads us into the question of, given a voluntary buyer, which
voluntary buyer? One buyer might want land for one purpose, while
another buyer for quite another purpose. This, of course, leads us
right back to potential, which demonstrates or presents a vicious
cycle. This writer is of the opinion that the term "full value" is a
fiction. It can never be fully determined. But I also feel that while
never reaching perfection, our attempts in that direction will put
us on a more nearer footing to equality and uniformity than we have
maintained under the fractional assessment basis that we have been
using.
Directly related to, or as a direct result of, the efforts to determine
what full value is, will be the need for more efficient techniques in
assessments. In fact, a leading tax authority, Dr. Troy Westmeyer of
New York University, says it will require improved assessment tech-
niques, the most up-to-date procedures and technically competent
personnel. 47 In line with this prediction, Commissioner Luckett has
already publicly stated that he will have to add additional manpower
to the Revenue Department in order to handle the added work.
There is no reason to believe that this will not be the result the entire
length down the vertical line of tax administration. There seems, at
this point, no way to escape this result, and added expense, even
through the suggested use of the "multiplier system." The method
consists of multiplying the current average assessment by a figure
designed to bring it up to 100%. But this would merely multiply
any existing inequalities, such as land being listed at its last sale
price which just happens to have been 100 years ago.
Another result of the decision will be to put responsibility on
the owner to have his assessment up where it belongs. There are
provisions in the statutes for fines up to $500 and prison terms up
to five years. In addition, it will end the discretion and sometimes
discrimination which tax assessors heretofore have been able to
exercise. Those who state that the decision will cause the assessors
job to become more routine, however, are mistaken. Every prop-
erty owner in the state will have some gripe about the new assess-
ment of his land. In Dade County, Florida, for example, where a
47 Supra, note 4,
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similar decision was handed down, according to Lee Selecman, ad-
ministrative officer in the County tax assessors office, there were
65,000 complaints to the board out of 330,000 parcels of land. That
was in one county 48
Up until now, if a property owner was being assessed too high,
he could not compel the court to raise his neighbor's assessment,
for to do so would only result in his neighbor being assessed higher
than the rest of the state and thus give him cause to complain about
discrimination. The taxpayers only recourse has been to petition to
have his own assessment lowered. But now he will be able to main-
tain a suit to have his neighbor's land raised in assessment. Since
this would not result in a heightening of neighborly spirit, it can be
assumed, however, that most people would rather have their own
assessment lowered on the basis of his neighbor's assessment and
leave the crusading to someone else.
One last point at this time, that being that the day of two assess-
ments of one parcel of land is over. For if the city assessor and the
county assessor arrive at a different value, even though either one is
extremely valid under different situations, assuming the existence of
the term "full value," as we must under this decision, one of the
assessments is wrong. Ideally, there can not exist two "full values"
for the purpose of taxation. A decision will have to be made as to
who goofed, even if it has to come to that ultimate arbitrator of all
unsolvable issues-the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
ADJUSTMENT OF RATES:
Herein lies the cause of 99%o of the fear and criticism of this
decision. The entire principle that taxes will not be increased many
times over rests on the premise that the rates will be lowered to the
point where taxes are the same, or a little higher as the need might be,
as they were before 100% assessment came into reality. If the assess-
ment ratio has been increased threefold with a corresponding de-
crease of the tax rate threefold, the resulting tax cost will be the same.
The fear is that the responsible authorities will not lower the rates.
But if it is kept in mind that these are elected officials, and are
subject to the people's wishes, then this fear will be destroyed. It is
to be expected that there will be a slight increase in taxation. Indeed,
this was the underlying current that swept this decision upon the
Commonwealth. But the raise will not be unreasonable. In addition
to the fact that the people who will set these rates are elected, and
4SHowerton, Full Value Assessment Unique? Courier-Journal, (Louisville)
June 11, 1965, p. 7, col. 1.
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thus subject to no re-election, the State School Board has to approve
all lessor school district's budgets. It could be safely assumed that
in the event that some school board went overboard in their enthusi-
asm, the State Board would not approve such a budget. This would
serve as a restraint on the local boards in the interim of their election
term. The local community should be delighted with this situation
since it serves to place more responsibility upon them instead of
centralizing more power toward the government, which is usually
the case.
DISCOURAGEMENT OF INDUSTRY:
Only two cities out of 125 surveyed in 1963 by the Tulsa Chamber
of Commerce assessed property at 100% of current market value.
They are Springfield, Massachusetts and Erie, Pennsylvania. 49 Kentucky
cities are not going to be joining a majority, as a result of this deci-
sion. There is no escaping the fact that tax advantages are one of
the criteria used by industry when they are evaluating possible plant
locations and it will not necessarily be the tax result of the decision
that will hurt Kentucky. Rather, it will be the stigma that attached
to the phrase 100% assessment. That, alone, is enough to prevent
someone from further investigation.
While the problem of what effect the decision will have on pre-
venting industry from migrating toward Kentucky (and anyone
parading the notion that there will not be an effect, is ridiculous)
is of importance, there is one of even greater importance. That of
preventing a mass exodus of the ones we already have. Of particular
concern in this area are the whiskey and thoroughbred industries.
Millard Cox, counsel for Kentucky Distillers Association (com-
prising 17 companies and about 90% of Kentucky's producers) states
that Kentucky's tax structure for distillers is already more burden-
some than in other states. As proof, he explains that a fifty gallon
barrel of whiskey is assessed at twenty-eight dollars in Kentucky.
The same barrel is assessed at ten dollars in Indiana and thirteen
dollars in Maryland. Several distillers have already moved their
aging warehouses to Indiana. 50
As further corroboration that a true problem exists, in August
1964, Spindletop Research reported that whiskey manufacturers were
expected to move operations to nearby states as facilities wear out
49 Courier Journal (Louisville), June 11, 1965. p. 7, col. 3.50 Tunnell, Tax Ruling May Drive Distillers Out, Courier-Journal, (Louis-
ville), June 11, 1965, p. 4, col. 4.
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and as funds derived from depreciation allowances accumulate to a
level which makes relocation financially feasible.57
While the individual land owner has been singing the woes over
the unlikely possibility that his taxes may be increased two or three
times, the thoroughbred industry, as the situation now stands, has
the dubious distinction of being in a position in which their taxes
may increase twenty-five times over their present cost. Turning again
to Wheatley Stable's Bold Ruler as an example, the horse's tax at
the $15,000 valuation is $75.00. (Fifty cents per hundred dollars
value). At the more realistic figure of $375,000 valuation, the taxes
would be $1,875.00 per year. Clearly, this industry would be stupidly
sentimental to remain in the Blue Grass when it could go to such
states as Florida and Maryland, where they are diabolically offering
to give away farms in order to lure this industry their way.
Commissioner Luckett, vhen asked about this problem, frankly
admitted that some concessions would have to be worked out for
these types of cases, or these industries will leave-no ifs, ands or
buts about it. The form that these safety valves will take, if they
take any, is up for speculation. It will undoubtedly be legislative,
but beyond that, there is no indication at this time.
One optimistic point concerning this problem is, that while there
is a likelihood of the decision having a deterrent effect on industry
in the 100% assessment respect, there remains the fact that good
educational facilities are also an important aspect considered by
industry when considering the possibilities for new plants. Perhaps
these two results wvill offset each other.
THE IMPENDING SPECIAL SESSION:
Of particular concern to educators in the state now is the up-
coming special session. There is open fear that the legislature will
undo the results of the Court of Appeals decision. This will not
materialize in this writer's opinion, if for no other reason than the
fact that prior to this decision there had been talk of proposed legis-
lation among these very legislators, to relieve the situation through
higher property assessments.
Of greater probability is the formulation of some plan to give
relief to Jefferson County this year since any increased tax income to
be derived will not be realized until next year. One such plan, and
the one being more lip-service at this time is a temporary occupa-
tional tax for Louisville and the surrounding county areas. It has




since it would take more than a year to wade through the court tests
and other technicalities that are bound to ensue.
What the result of that session will be should be known before
the publication of this note. (This causes me to wonder why I in-
cluded this section in the first place). Therefore, to dwell on this
topic will be of little value.
OUTSTANDING BONDS:
Many of the undertakings, both on a county basis and a school
board basis, are financed through the issuance of bonds. Many, if not
all, of these bond issues are contracts requiring, among other things,
that the tax rate which was in force at the time of the bond issue,
remain in effect. The question then presents itself, how are the tax
rates to be legally lowered in order to not have the feared tax in-
crease? At this point, there is no answer. There are some possible
solutions. One is to leave the rate for that particular project at the
inception level and retire the bonds quicker through the increased
revenue. This possibility would, of course, confirm every skeptic in
Kentucky, and could possibly result in multiple lynchings. Another
possibility would be for the courts to interpret the contract provi-
sions as pertaining to the duration in regard to the retirement of the
bonds. In other words, the court would interpret the contract as one
to last for a definite length of time with the rate provision simply
being an indication of this time. So, if the inception rate would
result in more revenue than needed to retire the issue in that set
period, then it would be permissible to retire the issue and lower the
rate, so long as the set period was not changed from its original
time. This would require some suave interpretation, but the Ken-
tucky Court seems to be adequate for the task.
This type of rate problem will not be limited to just the bond
issues, but there lies another of the problems in the implementation
of the decision-determining how many instances such as this exist.
ELECTION ISSUES:
When November 1965 arrives, so do two further issues which
will owe both a direct and indirect existence to Russ'man v. Luckett.
The direct bearing stems from the election of school board officials.
These are the people who will have the responsibility of adjusting
rates in accordance with commensurate assessment increases. It is
only logical to assume that this will become a major issue. And very
possibly, the man who can out promise the other candidate not to
cause a tax rise will be the man elected. But it would be wise
indeed to evaluate these candidates a great deal more closely than
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has been the practice in the past. These people are going to assume
a great deal more responsibility than had their predecessors.
To be decided in November also is the 176 million dollar bond
issue backed by the administration. There is substantial opinion that
Rus&man v. Luckett will have a negative effect on the passage of this
proposal. The people will very likely vote against a bond issue that
will in all probability result in a tax rise, when they are still pain-
fully aware that they face the same possibility beginning January
1, 1966.
THE GOOD:
While there are now many unanswered questions and the assur-
ance that more will arise in the future, there is also the over-riding
good that will result from the decision. Many words have been said
and much has been written through the news media concerning the
benefits expected to be derived from the decision, so many in fact
as to make it prohibitive to try and list them. There will be, of course,
the relief to the very real need of our school system. It is hoped
that this decision will be the prod that sends our school system
spiraling toward the top in the United States. There will also be the
needed relief to some of our county governments to enable them to
more adequately carry out their duties.
While we will probably never reach complete equality and
uniformity in our assessment structure, we can go but one direction
in the attempt to achieve perfection, and that is closer.
An indirect result will be the election of more qualified admin-
istrators for two reasons. First, with the added authority and the
power to drastically effect the voters tax costs, the voters themselves
will see to it that competent men are elected. Secondly, the added
responsibility will scare away the less qualified with the result that
only the more able members of the community will consent to carry
the responsibility.
While all the things mentioned are certainly for the betterment
of the state, the one general thing in regard to sheer benefit, will
be the opportunity for local responsibility. In the past, everyone
has systematically set the tax rate at the maximum. No thought was
needed, for even that was inadequate. But now the local communi-
ties will have to think for themselves in terms of their own needs
and abilities. It is depressing to hear the plea for legislature to set
the rates, instead of the pleader's own elected administrators. This
goes completely against the grain of the idea of local government-
democracy at the local level. Let us hope that as a result of this
decision, we do not find that the average man in the average town is
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neither unable nor unwilling to shoulder the responsibility of guid-
ing his own life.
SUMMARY:
In my opinion, the result reached by the court will, in the span
of time, turn out to be proper and rewarding. It will undoubtedly
be the cause for much teeth clashing and tear shedding. But in the
way of a democratic society, these problems will be slowly worked
out. The only real frightening aspect of this decision is the revela-
tion of the great power possessed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
It is the nimble ability of the court to adjust its reasoning processes
to fit the result desired that is creating as much concern as anything
else. Any way you slice this decision, the net result is going to be an
increase in taxation. Taxation is and has always been considered
a legislative prerogative. Thus the cry of judicial-legislation is not
unfounded. What makes it even more disturbing is the fact that the
Kentucky court made the decision with complete awareness that
one of the cases cited in its support was made following and in
sequence to a decision that had recognized this to be legislative
territory and had deferred the issuance of mandamus in order to
give the legislature of that state time to exercise its prerogative.
The court should not be allowed to become so powerful as to con-
sume the democratic system from which it breathes its own power.
It is also of interest to note, now that the analysis is past, that
in this case the defendant-appellee was forced, through his admin-
istrative position, to propose a ruling for which he was in complete
sympathy. Commissioner Luckett has many times voiced his con-
cern with the conditions in Kentucky and has even gone so far as to
print suggestions, some of which have either been incorporated into
this decision or simply appear there due to their merit.
In closing I would like to point out that the people of Kentucky,
and when I say people I include in the term the government, have
the power to destroy ownership of property in this state as we have
known it. But, if the decision is implemented in the manner that
the court intended when they handed it down, then the Common-
wealth should prosper as a result.
Roger M. Oliver
